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NOTE
THE ANTITRUST LEGALITY OF
TERRITORIAL ALLOCATIONS BETWEEN




Laws developed to address the common and ordinary busi-
ness situation frequently fail to serve the economic realities of
new or different circumstances. A case in point is our body of
antitrust laws well-tuned toward limiting the powers of large
corporations to restrict competition among themselves, but ill-
suited to meet the needs of small enterprises attempting to
break into industries dominated by such giants.'
This discrimination against small businesses arises from
the per se rules of antitrust liability. The purpose of the anti-
trust laws is to promote competition. Based on this premise the
customary test of legality for a given restraint is whether under
the circumstances it unreasonably impacts on competition.2
This rule of reason test, however, can require sophisticated
economic judgments. In order, thus, to avoid such unpleas-
antly complex economic issues the courts developed per se
antitrust rules. Rather than examine in detail the economic
impact of all restraints, the courts designated certain restraints
* B.A., 1971, M.A., 1973, University of North Carolina; J.D. candidate, 1978,
University of Denver.
1. See Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Re-
stricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975); Note, Territorial Restrictions and Per Se Rules-A Reeval-
uation of the Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 70 MICH. L. REv. 616 (1970)(arguing that
territorial restrictions should be permitted where the effect is to increase competition
in the marketplace). But see Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints under Schwinn
and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use of the Per Se Approach, 75 MICH.
L. REv. 275, 286-87 (1976); Note, International Joint Ventures and Section One of
the Sherman Act: Per Se as the Meaningful Standard, 23 AM. U.L. REv. 689 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as International Joint Ventures].
2. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
3. "The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic
problems." United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
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as having such a "pernicious effect on competiton [that they]
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal . . . ."I Consequently, once a per se practice has been
so identified, the court need no longer analyze the competitive
effects of the restraint in order to determine if such a practice
should be permitted; per se restraints are conclusively illegal.5
Although the per se rules ease the analytical burden on the
judiciary,' the practical effect can be to deny small enterprises
the use of certain "anticompetitive" devices, which can greatly
aid their efforts to enter new markets thereby increasing com-
petition in the industry.'
Perhaps the grossest and most inequitable example of the
harmful effect of United States per se rules on small enterprises
is their impact on less developed countries (LDCs) seeking
technology and investment from the United States.8 For exam-
ple, developing nations offer low labor costs and in some in-
stances proximity to foreign markets that would aid U.S. man-
ufacturers seeking to enhance their share of the U.S. or world
market.' However, most developing nations also require, or at
least strongly encourage, that enterprises established by for-
4. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
5. The strict per se rules of modem antitrust law establish a conclu-
sive presumption that a particular kind of action has improper anticom-
petitive effects, and this presumption governs regardless of whether the
particular conduct has been proved to have those consequences.
Moraine Products v. I.C.I. America, Inc. 538 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 941 (1976).
Consequently, "for the purposes of determining the existence of a per se antitrust
violation, market analysis and questions of evil or laudatory motive are irrelevant."
In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 541 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1976).
6. In fact the simplifying features of the rule is its principal appeal:
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of
restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the
benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in
an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See Jacobi v. Bache & Co.,
Inc., 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
7. See note 1 supra. See also Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Divison, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Note, Horizontal Territorial
Restraints and the Per Se Rule, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 457 (1971).
8. Friedmann, Antitrust Law and Joint International Business Ventures in Eco-
nomically Underdeveloped Countries, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 780 (1960).
9. See Rose, Why the Multinational Tide is Ebbing, FORTUNE, Aug. 1977, at 112.
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eign technology be controlled by local interests.'" Conse-
quently, a U.S. firm seeking to establish a manufacturing
branch in a less developed nation generally must face the pros-
pect that its investment, although yielding short term profits,
may also create a potential competitor." A partial solution is
for the parent and its offspring to agree not to compete by
allocating sales territories between each other. Unfortunately,
despite the apparent reasonableness of this territorial market
allocation, the scheme would violate the per se rules of U.S.
antitrust liability," if the restraint substantially affects the
foreign commerce of the United States. 3
This article examines the legality of territorial market allo-
cations between a U.S. parent and partially owned subsidraries
in LDCs. The primary thesis is that, although all market allo-
cations were illegal per se in the past, a logical extrapolation
of the recent Supreme Court Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc. '" decision to the international arena would per-
mit territorial market allocations restricting the exports of
newly created LDC businesses where the effect of the restraint
is to enable these new enterprises to be formed in the first
place. Although Continental TV only stands for the limited
10. See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 8, at 781, 786; MacDonald, Recent Legisla-
tion in Nigeria and Ghana Affecting Foreign Private Direct Investment, 6 INT'L L. 548
(1972); Ness, Brazil: Local Equity Participation in Multinational Enterprises, 6 L.
& POL. INT'L Bus. 1017 (1974); Zamora, Andean Common Market-Regulation of
Foreign Investments: Blueprint for the Future?, 10 INT'L L. 153 (1976).
11. Goekjian, Legal Problems of Transferring Technology to the Third World, 25
AM. J. COMP. L. 565, 568 (1977).
12. See the discussion of illegal market restraints in Joelson & Griffin,
Multinational Joint Ventures and the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 487
(1975); International Joint Ventures, supra note 1. See also note 18 infra.
13. Because of the jurisdictional requirement that an international market re-
straint have a substantial impact on the foreign commerce of the United States, the
narrow issue for review is the legality of the market division insofar as it affects imports
into and exports from the United States. Timberline Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945); Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the Antitrust Laws, 43 ABA
ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (1974). A market division between foreign companies which does
not include the United States would lack sufficient impact on U.S. commerce to
warrant jurisdiction. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976); MEMORANDUM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING ANTITRUST AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, [1977] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,129, at 55,209-10 (1972);
Fugate, International Distribution Agreements, 43 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 540, 542
(1974).
14. 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
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rule that a franchisor can allocate territories among his franchi-
sees, the rationale of the opinion supports this international
exception to the rule against territorial restraints.
In order to focus the analysis the following hypothetical
fact situation is posited: Alpha Company manufactures and
exports machine tools from the United States. Alpha has 20%
of the United States domestic market, 30% of the U.S. export
market, and 10% of the world export market. Because of in-
creasing labor and material costs, Alpha wishes to establish
Betas, related companies in LDCs that would manufacture and
export machine tools under the Alpha brand name. Alpha
would maintain some equity interest in each new company,
would receive fees for management services provided to each
company, but as required by local law would not control either
the management or the voting stock of any of the newly created
Betas. To protect itself from the competition of its Betas, and
to protect the Betas from competition between themselves,
Alpha proposes an allocation of markets between Alpha and
its progeny, limiting the sales of each to a specific geographic
market. Disregarding the effect of patent laws'5 and other
laws relating to industrial property rights,'" would such a
scheme survive an attack based on a violation of the Sherman
Act?'7
THE TIMKEN PRECEDENT
If the Alpha/Beta agreement involved domestic commerce
alone, there would be little doubt that the agreement would not
survive the per se rule against territorial market allocations.'
Does the same conclusive presumption of illegality apply to
international commerce as well? Some have argued that it
should not." Whereas the anticompetitive effects of domestic
15. See note 139 infra.
16. See notes 131 & 139 infra.
17. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in part: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. ... 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
18. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). See United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
19. Among those arguing for such a distinction are Carlston, Antitrust Policy
Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 713, 717-21 (1955); Friedmann, supra note 8, at 789-90;




market allocations are known and predictable, the challenges
of competing in international markets may present unique
demands on enterprises requiring market divisions in order
that these enterprises might successfully compete. Since mar-
ket allocations could have a net procompetitive impact when
utilized in international commerce, per se rules of conclusive
illegality are inappropriate to judge these restraints of foreign
trade. Unfortunately, however, no court has yet to adopt the
thesis that foreign commerce requires a relaxation of domestic
per se rules.'" The rule appears to be that all market divisions,
including international market divisions, are conclusively ille-
gal.2 Presumably, the Alpha/Beta agreement as structured
above is therefore illegal as well.
The Continental TV decision, however, may permit a con-
trary result-at least as applies to the Alpha/Beta model.
Continental TV creates two possible avenues by which the
Alpha/Beta allocations can avoid the per se ban and survive
antitrust attack. First, the rationale of the opinion supports the
broad hypothesis that the per se rule against domestic market
allocations is inappropriate when considering international
commerce. Second, and perhaps more useful, Continental TV's
limited exception to the per se territorial rule, when considered
along with other precedent, may itself be broad enough to ex-
empt the Alpha/Beta agreement from per se analysis. Once the
rule of reason test is applied, presumably the procompetitive
impact of the agreement will justify the market allocations. 2
Before addressing these escapes, however, one must first
inspect the per se prison. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
20. International Joint Ventures, supra note 1, at 706-07.
21. Essentially the argument is that a per se restraint such as market allocation
is irrefutably anticompetitive; therefore, the setting in which it is employed is irrele-
vant. Id. at 713-28.
When judging the propriety of efforts to cartelize an industry, the argument
against relaxing antitrust rules in international commerce is persuasive. However,
when judging restraints employed to gain a foothold in the market, the same per se
standards should not be applied. An international market, particularly one dominated
by a cartel outside of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction, poses far greater barriers to entry than
exist domestically. Restraints designed to facilitate entry into new markets therefore
should be permitted. The existing per se rules, however, permit no distinction between
territorial restraints aimed at creating a cartel and restraints aimed at competing with
that cartel.
22. See text accompanying notes 50-52 infra and note 21 supra.
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States 3 perhaps best exhibits the general rule that the per se
territorial allocation ban applies equally to international com-
merce. 4 In Timken, British, French, and American Timken,
through a combination of market allocations and price con-
trols, effectively divided the world market. Although the Court
found "an aggregation of trade restraints, '2 5 the principal pur-
pose of these restraints was to effect a division of territories
between the three competitors." The Court held this division
to be plainly illegal.Y In so ruling the Court rejected the notion
that antitrust standards are different in foreign commerce, at
least when industry leaders are involved:
[Tihe provisions in the Sherman Act against restraints of for-
eign trade are based on the assumption, and reflect the policy,
that export and import trade in commodities is both possible and
desirable. Those provisions of the Act are wholly inconsistent
with appellant's argument that American business must be left
free to participate in international cartels, that free commerce in
goods must be sacrificed in order to foster export of American
dollars for investment in foreign factories which sell abroad."8
23. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
24. Among the first indications that the antitrust rules were to be applied to
foreign and domestic commerce with equal vigor was the Second Circuit's discussion
of import restraints in United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1945). In finding
a violation of the Sherman Act the court made but two inquiries: (1) Were there
sufficient effects on U.S. commerce to invoke jurisdiction, and (2) did the restraints
violate U.S. antitrust laws? At no time did the court indicate that more flexible
standards were to be applied because the alleged violation was international in charac-
ter. Id. at 443, 444. See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAws 182,
185-86 (1973).
25. 341 U.S. at 598.
26. Id. at 596.
27. Id. at 598.
United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), presaged
the Timken holding. General Electric also involved an exchange of licenses designed
to maintain a territorial market division in the incandescent lamp industry. First hav-
ing labelled the agreements as elements of a cartel arrangement, the court found the
market allocations to be "entirely unreasonable insofar as the interest of the public is
concerned," and therefore illegal. Id. at 847.
28. Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
The New York district court in United States v. National Lead, 63 F. Supp. 513
(S.D.N.Y. 1945), had faced a similar defense and had reached the identical result. In
National Lead the court concluded that defendants, through territorial and cross-
licensing agreements, conspired to monopolize titanium. As a defense to liability de-
fendants argued that "American producers cannot do business successfully in a cartel-
ized world except on cartel terms; and that, to abstain from such business, would
amount to a greater restraint on trade than is involved in joining the cartel .... "
Id. at 526. The court dismissed the argument, stating that such an immunity from the
antitrust laws could only be granted by statute. Id. Defendants' scheme "[clovering
VOL. 7:103
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Timken's rejection of the international cartel is evident; the
specific rule to be derived from Timken is not, however. De-
spite the Court's vigorous censure of territorial schemes de-
signed to cartelize international commerce, the Court in
Timken stopped short of explicitly condemning all interna-
tional territorial allocations as illegal per se. 9 The omission of
the words "per se" leave open the possibility that Timken, even
today, can be limited to its facts. Specifically, it could be
argued that the Court's reference to international cartels lim-
ited Timken to those instances where the miscreants domi-
nated the relevant world market.30 Absent such market domi-
nance, market allocations may not necessarily be illegal as
being designed "to avoid all competition among themselves or
with others."
'3'
Admittedly the better view construes Timken's cartel lan-
guage as unnecessary judicial hyperbole. 31 Subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions have cited Timken as standing for the
rule that territorial market allocations are illegal per se. 33 In-
deed, United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries specifi-
an entire industry, and embracing a division of the world into exclusive territories"
was unlawful as an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 527. See also id. at 531, where
many of the same arguments are repeated and the court reaches the same conclusion.
29. Although not expressly stating that all territorial market allocations in inter-
national commerce are per se illegal, the district court did state that Timken's cartel
agreements were illegal per se. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F.
Supp. 284, 308-9 (N.D. Ohio 1949). See International Joint Ventures, supra note 1, at
705-06 (arguing that the Supreme Court focused on the illegality of the aggregation of
trade restraints in Timken, whereas the district court was more prone to adopt a
stricter per se approach).
30. Friedmann, supra note 8. Cf. R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
SociETz 289-90 (1970) (arguing that absent an unlawful purpose Timken restraints may
be permissible, i.e., when they are designed in overall impact to promote competition).
The district court indeed did find that, given the percentage of the market of the
conspirators, "[clommand of such volume of business spells out the dominant posi-
tion of defendant, British Timken and French Timken, both in the tapered and anti-
friction bearing industry." 83 F. Supp. at 289.
31. 341 U.S. at 597-98; see R. FALK, supra note 30.
32. See W. FUGATE, supra note 24, at 175-86; International Joint Ventures, supra
note 1, at 711-12 (both arguing that Timken stands for the rule that territorial re-
straints are equally illegal when employed in international commerce as when they are
employed in domestic commerce).
33. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); Citizen Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 135 (1969); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Co., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968); White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253,259 (1963); United States v. DuPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 387 n.10 (1956).
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cally rejected the notion that dominance must be shown in
order to strike an international territorial allocation. 4 None-
theless, the extent to which Timken applies to noncartel inter-
national market allocations has yet to be fully tested. To date,
Timken rules have been enforced only against major enter-
prises with substantial shares of the world market.
Although factually distinguishable from Timken, United
States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co."5 exhibits the judici-
ary's concern with cartels more than with the specific restraint
of international market allocation. The government charged
3M and a number of other domestic producers with restraint
of the export trade in coated abrasives. As the government
complained, the companies accomplished this result by estab-
lishing joint venture companies to manufacture and distribute
abrasives in those areas that in the past had been the export
markets in which the companies competed." The court held
that this scheme violated the Sherman Act.
37
34. United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
addressed the legality of joint venture arrangements between DuPont and ICI which
the partners established in territories not already assigned to one or the other via a
patent license. The court found that these agreements represented a conspiracy to
divide markets. "In the face of this finding, the law is crystal clear: a conspiracy to
divide territories, which affects American commerce, violates the Sherman Act." Id.
at 592. Drawing no distinction between foreign and domestic commerce, the court
reasoned that the market allocation of defendants was no different legally from price
fixing. Consequently the court reached the further conclusion that the defendant's
liability was not barred by the government's failure to allege market dominance by the
defendants:
There is no intimation in any decision that elimination of competition is
to be given a more favorable judicial consideration when achieved by the
route of territorial division rather than by way of price fixing, or that
proof of industry domination is required in one case though not required
in the other.
Id. at 593.
Despite this strong language, even Imperial Chemical can be viewed as barring
only market allocations by cartels. Even though the court disdained an examination
of market dominance, there is little question that such dominance did in fact exist.
Thus in considering the proper remedial order a later court stated:
Although no charge has been made of monopolization and no evi-
dence presented to sustain such a charge, we find that the principal
defendants are potent factors in the fields in which they have engaged.
105 F. Supp. 215, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Moreover, the court made careful note that the
agreements at issue were not between newly formed enterprises but rather between
existing competitiors. There was no doubt that the overall impact and design of the
allocation was to restrain competition. 100 F. Supp. at 557.
35. 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
36. Id. at 952-54.
37. Id. at 962-64.
VOL. 7:103
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW
Because of worrisome dicta, 3 some commentators view 3M
for the extreme proposition that virtually all foreign joint ven-
ture arrangements between U.S. companies are illegal." In fact
3M, like Timken, was only aimed at curtailing international
cartel arrangements. 0 Three factual prerequisites for the 3M
holding stand out. First, the joint venture was between exist-
ing, competing domestic enterprises;4' second, these cooperat-
ing firms dominated the U.S. export market in coated abra-
sives-4/5ths to be exact; and, finally, the court found that it
was profitable for the firms to export independently to these
overseas markets.43 Although the joint ventures in 3M lacked
the explicit territorial restrictions employed in Timken and
proposed in the Alpha/Beta agreement, the practical territorial
impact was virtually the same." On the other hand, the
Alpha/Beta allocation contains none of the cartel/monopoly
overtones which the 3M court found objectionable, and there-
fore remains distinguishable from both 3M and Timken.
Scholarly analysis of foreign territorial arrangements not
only tends to confirm the hypothesis that the Timken rule has
been applied only against monopolies, 5 but singles out 3M as
the most restrictive of the foreign joint venture cases." To re-
38. It may very well be that even though there is an economic or
political barrier which entirely precludes American exports to a foreign
country, a combination of dominant American manufacturers to estab-
lish joint factories for the sole purpose of serving the internal commerce
of that country is a per se violation of this other clause of the Sherman
Act. The intimate association of the principal American producers in
day-to-day manufacturing operations, their exchange of patent licenses
and industrial know-how, and their common experience in marketing and
fixing prices may inevitably reduce their zeal for competition inter sese
in the American market.
Id. at 963. Significantly, the court seems to be more concerned with domestic competi-
tion than with the potential restraint on foreign commerce.
39. Note, Joint Ventures Abroad and Per Se Antitrust Violations, 1 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 95, 107-9 (1970).
40. See Joelson & Griffin, supra note 12, at 512; International Joint Ventures,
supra note 1, at 709-10 (both explaining the factual determinations required before the
3M per se analysis could be applied. See also R. FALK, supra note 30, at 291-95.
41. 92 F. Supp. at 952, 953, 963.
42. Id. at 961.
43. Id. at 962, 963.
44. That is, the primary purpose of the entire scheme was to eliminate competi-
tion in exports. Id. at 961.
45. Friedmann, supra note 8, at 782-84. See also W. FUGATE, supra note 24, at 158-
61; International Joint Ventures, supra note 1, at 704.
46. Friedmann, supra note 8, at 786-87; Joelson & Griffin, supra note 12, at 510-
1977
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peat, the better view is that Timken did indeed bar territorial
allocations between international competitors regardless of
their share of the market. However, only Imperial Chemical
has explicitly ruled to that effect,47 and no court has yet to
apply the Timken rule in a case which did not in fact involve
a cartel arrangement." The Justice Department itself has im-
plicitly followed the noncartel exception to Timken by limiting
11; International Joint Ventures, supra note 1, at 709-11.
47. See the discussion of Imperial Chemicals at note 34 supra.
48. United States v. Bayer Co., 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), illustrates the
courts' continuing failure to close the noncartel loophole. Although the Bayer court
noted that a division of world markets was a per se restraint on U.S. commerce, thereby
invoking the jurisdiction of the antitrust laws, id. at 70, the court neglected to make
the same statement with respect to the illegality of the agreement itself. Rather, the
court noted that at the time at issue Bayer and its co-conspirator, I.B. Farben (then
Leverkusen), were "majors" in the world market. "Indeed, no issue [was] raised by
the defendant on this score." Id. at 68. The court noted that the agreements amounted
to the "usual form of international cartel arrangement." Id. at 69, quoting General
Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co., Inc., 188 Misc. 929, 930, 64 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494
(1946). Consequently in determining liability the court concluded:
The allocation of the world markets of the defined pharmaceutical prod-
ucts amongst Bayer, I.G. Farben and Bayer Products Limited is so all
pervasive as to constitute a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act
Id. at 70 (emphasis added). Although undoubtedly the court noted the pervasiveness
of the arrangment in order to distinguish the conspirators use of trademark licenses,
arguably the pervasiveness requirement could apply to the presence or absence of
market dominance as well. Other cases barring territorial allocations in situations
where the conspirators dominated the relevant market include: United States v.
United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); United States v.
General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
See also Foundry Services Inc. v. The Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.
1953), rev'd on other grounds, 206 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953), which held that Timken
did not apply to an ordinary exclusive license of a secret process. In validating the
accompanying territorial limitation the court noted:
It is not shown or even claimed that this license agreement was used
either alone or in combination with related agreements to achieve a mo-
nopoly in the business of fluxes generally or in any other industry.
Id. at 860-61. Of course Foundry Services can be distinguished from the pure territorial
allocation being examined here in the context of the Alpha/Beta agreement in that
Foundary Services involved a trade secret. See note 139 infra and the discussion of
DuPont at text accompanying notes 136-39 infra. See also United States v. Holophane
Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), which judged a
worldwide market allocation to be illegal according to the following rule of reason test:
The evidence establishes that the restrictive agreements were designed
to eliminate competition between the parties and with outsiders in all
markets of the world, and were neither measurable by, limited to, nor
subordinate to the reasonable necessities of the sale.
Id. at 119. See generally E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
PRIMER 74-78 (1974).
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their prosecutorial efforts to monopolistic situations, agree-
ments between dominant parties where the territorial restraint
has no rationale beyond limiting competition between the par-
ties.4" Consequently, the Timken territorial holding remains
readily subject to judicial redefinition.
49. For example, in assessing the validity of territorial restraints imposed on
foreign licenses of know-how, the Department will examine the general availability of
the know-how and the market dominance of the contracting parties:
Territorial restrictions would not be permissible if unreasonable in light
of the know-how involved or part of a larger illegal plan to cartelize the
market ....
Thus . . . the restrictions could be upheld if the know-how being
transferred is of substantial value, the territorial restrictions are limited
to a reasonable period and the agreement is not part of a larger plan to
divide markets between dominant firms.
MEMORANDUM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 55,209.
Similarly, recent consent decrees and their accompanying competitive impact
statements filed by the Justice Department exhibit the same concern for attacking
territorial restrictions that lack a competitive rationale. In United States v. Norman
M. Morris Corp., 41 Fed. Reg. 5365 (1976), the Department attacked an agreement
restricting import and resale of Omega and Tissot Swiss watches. The Department
noted that in 1972 55% of all watches purchased in the U.S. were manufactured in
Switzerland and that a substantial number of these were the above-named brands. The
Department further noted that Switzerland is the world's largest exporter of watches.
In United States v. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 41 Fed. Reg. 32617 (1976), the
Department attacked a network of exclusive licensing agreements which in effect pro-
hibited exports from America to Britain of English language books and vice versa. The
vehicle used to enforce this restraint was the Publishers Association, "a British organi-
zation whose membership includes virtually all major United Kingdom publishing
houses. ... Id. In effect, the licensing requirements of the Association restrained
virtually all traffic in English books between the two countries.
Finally, and perhaps most directly on point, United States v. Foote Mineral Co.,
40 Fed. Reg. 59,358 (1975), outlawed a worldwide territorial allocation of lithium
products. The agreement was between Foote, which produced lithium in its raw state,
and Metallgesellschaft, who purchased its materials from Foote and absent the market
allocation would have competed with Foote in the sale of lithium products. In banning
the territorial division, the Department noted that Foote was one of only five enter-
prises worldwide which recovers lithium in its natural state and that Foote accounted
for 45% of U.S. natural state production.
Significantly, the Department did not disturb an agreement which in effect pre-
vented Foote from underselling Metall in Europe. The Department commented that
given the long term supply contracts involved. Metall required such protection in
order to retain incentive to compete with Foote in other markets. Otherwise Foote
could undercut Metall in its home territory in response to any competition by Metall
in other geographic areas.
Department officials themselves have further noted their own focus on cartels of
dominant parties. See Address by Donald I. Baker, Antitrust Division, Department of
Justice, New York State Bar Ass'n, Antitrust Law Section Annual Meeting, Jan. 24,
1973, quoted in International Joint Ventures, supra note 1, at 704.
To conclude this discussion one caveat must be expressed. Although the Justice
Department may tacitly recognize a noncartel exception, that "authority" is of little
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As alluded to above, the rationale for a noncartel interna-
tional exception to the territorial rule derives from the poten-
tial procompetitive impact of allocations between small inter-
national businesses. For example, although restraining compe-
tition between themselves, the Alpha/Beta allocation permits
the creation of the new Beta enterprises, thereby permitting
the group to compete more effectively in more world markets.'"
Without the help of Alpha, native LDC investors would lack
the technological and financial resources necessary to launch
such enterprises as the Betas. The "restraint" permits the crea-
tion of new businesses that otherwise would not be financially
feasible. The procompetitive impact of the market allocation
almost certainly satisfies the demands of the rule of reason.5'
Consequently, by employing a noncartel exception to relieve
international market allocations between small enterprises
from the per se impact of Timken, arrangements such as the
Alpha/Beta agreement can escape antitrust liability by satisfy-
ing the less stringent rule of reason requirement.
52
The importance to the Alpha/Beta agreement of creating
such a noncartel exception to the Timken rule becomes more
evident when one considers that host country laws typically
preclude the use of the principal "end around" to the Timken
territorial rule: practical market division through corporate
integration. Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires a conspiracy
between competitors.13 Thus, an enterprise can avoid Timken
through internal expansion, so that the "competitors" with
which one plans to divide territories will in fact be but parts of
one single corporate entity. Absent such unity an enterprise
will be potentially liable for antitrust violations. Thus,
use if the courts do not recognize the exception as well. If the courts stick to an absolute
per se approach, a contracting party will be able to use the antitrust illegality of the
agreement as a defense to an action on the contract. See the discussion of Continental
TV at text accompanying notes 93-94 infra. Even if one avoids this problem through
arbitration and/or choice-of-law clauses, there is the additional prospect of suits by
"injured" consumers, state attorneys general representing those consumers, or even
suits on behalf of foreign consumers. See Caplan, Parens Patriae Antitrust Suits by
Foreign Nations, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 705 (1976).
50. See generally text accompanying notes 140-42. 144 infra.
51. See text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
52. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (possibly representing
the original statement of the rule of reason test).
53. See note 17 supra.
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the central message of the Sherman Act is that a business entity
must find new customers and higher profits through internal ex-
pansion-that is, by competing successfully rather than by ar-
ranging treaties with its competitors.5 '
In other words, a corporation cannot illegally conspire with
itself;51 therefore, completely integrated parts of one enterprise
can "divide" territories with other integrated parts of the same
enterprise.
However, host country local control laws prevalent in
LDCs prevent an international company from meeting this sin-
gle business entity test, at least as the term has been inter-
preted by the courts to date. Unfortunately for LDC enter-
prises, the courts narrowly construe what represents an inte-
grated business entity for the purposes of "exemption" from
the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has stated "that even
commonly owned firms must compete against each other, if
they hold themselves out as distinct entities."5 In Timken the
Court imposed liability despite the fact that American Timken
owned thirty and fifty percent of British and French Timken
respectively. 7 Quite plausibly Timken presented no
"conspiracy" in restraint of trade. The Court, however, deter-
mined that the three Timkens were separate entities and there-
fore subject to liability for allocating territories. "The fact that
there is common ownership or control of the contracting corpo-
rations does not liberate them from the impact of the antitrust
laws.""8
The apparent harshness of Timken's approach to intracor-
porate conspiracy is somewhat diminished by the district
court's earlier determination that American Timken and Bri-
tish and French Timken were in fact two independent enter-
prises. 59 Nonetheless, a number of subsequent decisions have
eschewed the district court's concern for practical independ-
ence in favor of a more formalisitc separate incorporation test
of conspiracy. 0 Thus, citing Timken, the Supreme Court in
54. United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975).
55. Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1969).
56. 422 U.S. at 116.
57. 83 F, Supp. at 292, 294.
58. 341 U.S. at 598.
59. 83 F. Supp. at 292.
60. Joe Westbrook, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 419 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Ga. 1976);
Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1009 (D.N.J. 1976).
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Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp. in-
structed.: "[Slince respondents Midas and International
availed themselves of the privilege of doing business through
separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not
save them from the obligations that the law imposes on sepa-
rate entities."
'61
Regardless of one's approach, the intracorporate conspir-
acy issue poses a number of controversies: Can commonly
owned but noncompeting enterprises be held liable under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act for conspiring to restrain trade? The
general rule appears to be that they can.62 Although unincor-
porated divisions of an enterprise cannot conspire, 3 what about
wholly owned subsidiaries? The general response is that wholly
owned subsidiaries can indeed illegally conspire with each
other."4
The problem for LDC enterprises is evident. If wholly
owned subsidiaries can illegally conspire to restrain trade, how
can locally owned and/or locally controlled LDC enterprises
hope to claim that their territorial allocations with their U.S.
parent do not represent a conspiracy between competitors.
Even under a test which examines the restraint in terms of
See also Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951)
(finding the separate incorporation test particularly applicable where the enterprises
hold themselves out as competitors). But see Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Man-
agement Co., 553 F.2d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 1977). For summaries of many of the cases
dealing with intracorporate conspiracies, see Annot., 20 A.L.R. Fed. 682 (1974).
61. 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968).
62. Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equipment Corp., 543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir.
1976); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1110 (1975); T.V. Signal Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 462
F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1972); Tamaron Distributing Corp. v. Weiner, 418 F.2d 137 (7th
Cir. 1969); Joe Westbrook, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 419 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
See Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 376 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Pa. 1974), order
vacated, 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975). But see Ark. Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron
Corp., 461 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1972); Call Carl Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568
(D. Md. 1975).
63. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors Ltd., 416 F.2d
71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062. See Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger,
Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969).
64. Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975); Battle v.
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110
(1975); Minnesota Bearing Co. v. White Motor Corp., 470 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1973);
Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1009 (D.N.J. 1976). But
see also In re REA Express, Inc., Private Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation, 412 F.
Supp. 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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practical independence," or under the Justice Department's
criteria which invokes strictest scrutiny only where ownership
by the parent is less than fifty percent, 6 an Alpha/Beta
enterprise will not escape antitrust liability under the "one
corporation" rule. For per se restraints to be permissible, the
U.S. antitrust laws require integrated expansion by the parent;
the laws of the host nation require local ownership. The in-
compatability of the two requirements necessarily subjects
LDC enterprises to antitrust restrictions which in more de-
veloped nations can be generally avoided through integration.
Given the general policy in favor of investment in the poorer
nations, 7 one would expect an opposite result.
65. One practical approach is to determine if in reality there are two distinct
functional corporate entities.
[Alt least where the corporations are horizontally related, separate in-
corporation may not defeat the need for substance to prevail over form
when only a single business unit exists. Separate incorporation, like the
lack of intraenterprise competition, is not dispositive of the question, but
only one factor in the calculus.
Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 625-26 (9th Cir.
1977), citing Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 2977 (1977).
Taking a similar approach, another line of cases appears to examine the corporate
relationship together with the particular restraint in order to determine if liability
should be imposed. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). See Coleman
Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding Chrysler liable for
a conspiracy with its factory-owned dealerships to the detriment of independent deal-
ers-almost a monopolization claim); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d
39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975) (holding that insurance company
could not utilize a tying arrangement with its wholly owned funeral home subsidiary);
Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. New House, 319 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that
it was permissible for a newspaper to grant free advertising to a commonly owned radio
station as the practical impact was only a redistribution of corporate profits). See also
Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section I of the Sherman Act: A Suggested
Standard, 75 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1977).
66. "The Department of Justice has consistently accepted the view stated in the
1955 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws: a parent corporation may allocate territories or set prices for the subsidiaries
that it fully controls." DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS, reprinted in [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799 at E-1
(Feb. 1, 1977). Normally, majority equity control represents the test for avoiding an
illegal conspiracy. However, the Department notes that "the same reasoning may
apply to a minority position where the U.S. firm maintains effective working control."
Moreover, the Department also intimates that some nonmajority, noncontrolled sub-
sidiaries may nonetheless allocate territories; at no point in the example did the De-
partment adopt a per se rule. Significantly, the example used to express these stan-
dards assumed that the parent was a multinational who was a worldwide leader in its
field. Id. See note 49 supra.
67. See, e.g., the discussion of economic rights in Starr, International Protection
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SCHWINN, ToPCO AND THE DEFENSE OF PROCOMPETITIVE IMPACT
The -Supreme Court's apparent willingness in Continental
TV to carve exceptions to the per se rule against territorial
restraints thus acquires an added significance for businesses in
the general relationship of Alpha and Beta as described above.
Continental TV seems to offer an opportunity to avoid the
single corporate entity paradox by permitting Betas to employ
their very poverty and local laws as a defense to an antitrust
action attacking territorial agreements with their parent. If
Betas can be created only by permitting territorial divisions,
presumably the net procompetitive impact of those divisions
deserves some form of immunity from per se, conclusive illegal-
ity.
However, Schwinn,65 and later Topco,6 previously had
barred the use of such a reasonability defense when territorial
market allocations were involved. Schwinn accomplished the
first broad rejection of the procompetitive impact defense. Al-
though a number of restraints were involved in the franchising
system set up by Schwinn to market its bicycles,"0 for our pur-
poses the principal restraint prevented distributors from selling
bicycles to retailers outside of their designated territories.
Schwinn argued that this restraint was required in order for it
to survive the competition posed by giant mass retailers such
as Sears." The Court agreed to some extent, allowing Schwinn
to retain some of the features of its franchise system." How-
ever, such arguments of competitive reasonableness were not
even considered in relation to Schwinn's territorial restraints.
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a
manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with
whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted
with dominion over it."s
In distinguishing an earlier line of cases the Court did note
that exceptions to the per se rule may apply to a new business
of Human Rights and the United Nations Covenants, 1967 Wisc. L. REv. 863, as well
as the policy considerations expressed in Nanda, Selected Legal Issues in the World
Population/Food Equation, published in this issue.
68. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
69. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
70. 388 U.S. at 370-71; 237 F. Supp. at 326-27.
71. 388 U.S. at 368-69, 376-77.
72. Id. at 379-80.
73. Id. at 379.
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or a failing company.74 However, attempting to maintain one's
market position does not have such a corresponding exception.
The promotion of self-interest alone does not invoke the rule of
reason to immunize otherwise illegal conduct. It is only if the
conduct is not unlawful in its impact in the marketplace or if the
self-interest coincides with the statutory concern with the preser-
vation and promotion of competition that protection is
achieved.75
Thus, the most that can be said for Schwinn is that it left the
door open for some additional exceptions to the per se rule
where a net procompetitive impact clearly results.
Topco closed this door. Topco was an association of small
and medium size regional supermarket chains that served as a
purchasing agent for its members.76 The members created the
association to permit them to buy items in large quantities,
and to foster the development of private label brands which
these smaller chains could then use to meet the private label
competition of the giants." The Justice Department attacked
the association's territorial restriction, which prevented mem-
ber firms from selling Topco-controlled brands outside their
designated marketing territory. 8
In some respects the motive of the Topco territorial ar-
rangement was less reasonable than Schwinn in that it flowed
horizontally from competing member retailers, rather than
having been imposed upon the retailers vertically by a con-
cerned manufacturer.79 On the other hand, more clearly than
Schwinn, the net economic effect of the Topco territorial ar-
rangement was to promote rather than restrict competition."o
74. Id. at 374.
75. Id. at 375. For a discussion of the international implications of Schwinn, now
mooted by the Continental TV decision, see E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, supra note 48,
at 95-97. See also United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1969)(applying Schwinn to a British company selling in bulk within the United
States).
76. 405 U.S. at 598.
77. Id. at 598, 599 n.3.
78. Id. at 601.
79. A horizontal market allocation is an agreement between competitors at the
same level of the distribution chain. Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams
& Co.-East, 377 F. Supp. 418, 424-25 (C.D. Cal. 1974), modified, 542 F.2d 1053 (9th
Cir. 1976). However, as demonstrated in text accompanying notes 118-21 infra, defin-
ing a horizontal agreement and proving a horizontal agreement are two completely
different tasks.
80. See Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 533 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1975),
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The territorial restraints strengthened the Topco Association;
and the stronger the association the greater the ability of Topco
members to compete with the large national chains. As the
district court determined,
[w]hatever anti-competitive effect these practices may have on
competition in the sale of Topco private label brands is far out-
weighed by the increased ability of Topco members to compete
both with the national chains and other supermarkets operating
in their respective territories."
Based on a rule of reason analysis, the Topco territorial alloca-
tion would have been permissible. 2
The Supreme Court, however, determined that it was error
to apply the rule of reason test; horizontal territorial restric-
tions require the per se rule of illegality.8 3 In so holding the
Court refused to consider whether the net impact of the re-
straint was really procompetitive.
The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining difficult
economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful
sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the economy
against promotion of competition in another sector is one impor-
tant reason we have formulated per se rules.8"
Once per se analysis is invoked, the alleged procompetitive
impact of the restraint becomes irrelevant.8 s
The practical harshness of the Topco holding was subse-
quently tempered by the court's ruling that Topco would be
permitted to retain areas of primary responsibility." However,
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2966 (1977).
81. 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1970), quoted in 405 U.S. 596, 605-6 (1972).
82. The Topco licensing provisions are not inherently unreasonable
and have no substantial adverse effect on competition in the relevant
market. They are ancillary and subordinate to the . . . legitimate, pro-
competitive purpose of the Topco cooperative, reasonable and in the
public interest.
319 F. Supp. at 1038.
83. 405 U.S. at 608.
84. Id. at 609-10. But see id. at 624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
85. "In applying these rigid rules, the Court has consistently rejected the notion
that naked restraints of trade are to be tolerated because . . . they are allegedly
developed to increase competition." Id. at 610. But see Chief Justice Burger dissent
for the argument that precedent required no such rigid rule. Id. at 613.
86. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. 93,797 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
Areas of primary responsibility normally invoke price/profit penalties against
those who sell outside their areas. If the penalty is too great, the court will declare it
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Topco nonetheless clearly indicates that procompetitive im-
pact is not a defense to a charge of territorial market allocation.
As a result Topco eliminated the principal argument justifying
the Alpha/Beta territorial restraint: that the restraint aids
market entry by competitively disadvantaged LDC investors,
and thereby promotes competition.
THE CONTINENTIAL TV EXCEPTIONS
Domestically, the impact of Schwinn and Topco led to
some complaints87 and more than a little subterfuge.m For fran-
chise operations the principal avoidance technique was the use
of exclusive dealership arrangements, which are considered
legal under the antitrust laws.89 By strategically locating exclu-
to be an illegal market allocation. See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco
Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
87. For example in Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975), the Federal Trade Commission attacked Coors' practice
of restricting the territories of its distributors. Coors maintained that the restrictions
were required to maintain quality since Coors beer uniquely requires that it be refriger-
ated until sold to the consumer. The court reluctantly rejected Coors' argument:
Although we are compelled to follow the Schwinn per se rule rendering
Coors' territorial restrictions on resale illegal per se, we believe that the
per se rule should yield to situations where a unique product requires
territorial restrictions to remain in business . . . . Perhaps the Supreme
Court may see the wisdom of grafting an exception to the per se rule when
a product is unique and where the manufacturer can justify its territorial
restraints under the rule of reason.
Id. at 1187.
88. For example, one manufacturer expressly contracted with its distributor that
the manufacturer retain title to its product (Green Stamps) in the hope of coming
within the maintenance of title exception to Schwinn. Finding that the risk of loss had
passed to the distributor, the mere contracting to retain title did not exempt the resale
restrictions from the Schwinn rule. Eastex Aviation, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
522 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1975).
Other manufacturers assigned territories without expressly limiting sales to those
territories. In such instances the court will look to see if the manufacturer enforced a
territorial restriction. See, e.g., Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Reed Brothers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976); Hobart Brothers v. Malcolm T. Gilliland,
Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973); Fontana Aviation, Inc.
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971)
(finding such active enforcement); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 810
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2977 (1977); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v.
Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Janel Sales
Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968)
(failing to find the requisite amount of enforcement by the manufacturer).
89. See, e.g., Universal Brands, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 546 F.2d 30 (5th Cir.
1977); Williams v. Independent News Co., Inc., 485 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1973); Akron
Tire Supply Co. v. Gebr. Hofmann KG, 390 F. Supp. 1395 (N.D. Ohio 1975). But see
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sive dealers, by limiting the number of dealers, and by requir-
ing dealers to sell only from designated locations one can in
practice achieve a territorial allocation. The success of such a
scheme depends upon the manufacturer's ability to control the
number and location of its exclusive dealers in a given area.
Thus, the validity of such schemes came to turn on whether
franchise applications are denied because of independent busi-
ness judgment or the urging of existing nearby dealerships. The
latter was of course illegal," while the former apparently was
not.9 '
Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc."2 examined
just such a scheme. Sylvania had adopted an exclusive fran-
chising arrangement with its retailers in an effort to boost its
sales from the dismal one to two percent of the market to which
Sylvania had fallen. An essential element of the plan was the
conscious limitation of the number of retail outlets in a given
area in the hope that by so limiting competition Sylvania could
attract an aggressive group of retailers. "[Slylvania retained
sole discretion to increase the number of retailers in an area in
light of the success or failure of existing retailers in developing
their market."" Licensed retailers could sell only from desig-
nated locations.
In a dispute between Sylvania and a former franchisee,
Continental TV, the latter raised the illegality of the franchise
plan under the Sherman Act as a counterclaim to Sylvania's
action to recover goods in Continental's possession.94 Continen-
tal claimed that the franchise plan was an illegal territorial
allocation. Sylvania denied that any such market division had
occurred.
Justice Powell's opinion cut through the exclusive dealer-
ship subterfuge and labelled the locational restraint as func-
also Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 471 n.6 (8th Cir. 1976)
(indicating that a perpetual exclusive dealership may be illegal).
90. Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976); Ameri-
can Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
91. Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975); Kaiser v.
General Motors Corp., 396 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 530 F.2d
964 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Sheldon Pontiac v. Pontiac Motor Division, 418 F. Supp.
1024 (D.N.J. 1976).
92. 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
93. Id. at 2552.
94. Id. at 2552-53.
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tionally identical to the territorial allocation held to be illegal
in Schwinn. 95 However, rather than holding for Continental TV
based on the Schwinn rule, the Court reexamined and rejected
the Schwinn per se approach to territorial restraints. The spe-
cific reason for the reversal derives from the Court's decision
to endorse franchising arrangements in general;9" the Schwinn
court had viewed franchising with intense suspicion. 7 The
Court determined that many vertical territorial restraints can
be on balance procompetitive. Since "[p]er se rules of illegal-
ity are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is
manifestly anti-competitive,''9 this finding warranted rejec-
tion of Schwinn's per se bar to vertical territorial restraints.
The Court's determination with regard to the possible pro-
competitive impact of such vertical restraints rests on the
Court's analysis of the distinction between interbrand and in-
trabrand competition. "Interbrand competition is the competi-
tion among the manufacturers of the same generic product
. . . . In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition
between the distributors-wholesale or retail-of the product
of a particular manufacturer."99 An examination of the compet-
itive impact of a territorial allocation must weigh the re-
straint's effect on both types of competition.00 Consequently,
although territorial restrictions imposed on retailers by a man-
ufacturer will dull intrabrand competition, if these restrictions
also assist that small manufacturer to penetrate a market, in-
terbrand competition, and competition in general, may be in-
creased. Often smaller businesses can not grow to the status of
a viable competitor without the efficiencies offered by vertical
95. Id. at 2556.
96. Id. at 2556-62, 2561 n.26, 2560 n.22. See text accompanying notes 122-125
infra.
97. The Court in Schwinn noted that to permit territorial restrictions once title
had passed "would sanction franchising and confinement of distribution as the ordi-
nary instead of the unusual method" of retailing products. 388 U.S. at 379.
98. 97 S. Ct. at 2558.
99. Id. at 2559 n.19.
100. In fact the Court criticized the Schwinn opinion for failing to examine both
aspects of competition: "Significantly, the Court in Schwinn did not distinguish
among the challenged restrictions on the basis of their individual potential for intra-
brand harm or interbrand benefit." Id. at 2559. An excellent analysis of the potential
varying impacts of vertical restraints on both interbrand and intrabrand competition
can be found at Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 941 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1975).
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territorial allocations.' 0' It is the restraint's "potential for a
simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimu-
lation of interbrand competition"''02 which renders inappro-
priate the per se rule's conclusive presumption of illegality.' 3
A NONCARTEL EXCEPTION FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE?
To assess the impact of Continental TV on the Alpha/Beta
international agreement initially requires an examination of
the broader rationale behind the opinion. The Continental TV
Court relied on the analysis of White Motor Co. v. United
States'4 for authority to repudiate the Schwinn per se doc-
trine.'0 White Motor had refused to apply per se rules to verti-
cal territorial restraints.
We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of
these arrangements on competition to decide whether they have
such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack any redeeming
virtue" and therefore should be classified as per se violations of
the Sherman Act.'1
Presumably the same analysis can justify additional exceptions
to the per se rules.'0 7
Specifically, if faced with the opportunity, perhaps the
current Court would now draw a distinction between domestic
and international commerce when applying the per se rules. As
noted earlier, to date the courts have failed to verbalize sepa-
rate rules for international trade. However, as also noted ear-
lier, the courts have yet to face a fact situation that would
101. Id. at 2561. The Court went on to note that eliminating the per se rule may
also benefit small franchisees where the manufacturer is an established entity.
We also note that per se rules in this area may work to the ultimate
detriment of the small businessmen who operate as franchisees. To the
extent that a per se rule prevents a firm from using the franchise system
to achieve efficiencies that it perceives as important to its successful
operation, the rule creates an incentive for vertical integration into the
distribution system, thereby eliminating to that extent the role of in-
dependent businessmen.
Id. at 2561 n.26.
102. Id. at 2559.
103. "Certainly, there has been no showing in this case, either generally or with
respect to Sylvania's agreements, that vertical restrictions have or are likely to have a
'pernicious effect on competition' or that they 'lack any redeeming virtue."' Id. at 2562.
104. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
105. 97 S. Ct. at 2558.
106. 372 U.S. at 263. See note 103 supra; 97 S. Ct. at 2558.
107. See Chief Justice Burger's dissent in United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 613-24 (1972).
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require that such a distinction be made; all of the previous
opinions have dealt with cartel-like situations. Arguably these
early opinions did not articulate a per se rule at all beyond the
statement that monopoly practices are presumptively illegal.
As with the domestic application of the Sherman Act, its
international application is designed to promote competition.'"'
As was stated in White Motor'0 and repeated in Continental
TV, a given restraint becomes illegal per se only when its
known impact on competition is so pernicious that it warrants
the conclusive presumption of illegality that a per se rule en-
tails." ' Surely the financial, technical, and marketing re-
sources required to penetrate international markets may re-
quire territorial restraints in some instances; the business judg-
ment underlying the Alpha/Beta agreement aptly illustrated
this."' Allocations between industry leaders may well be illegal
per se as their anticompetitive effects are known. But absent
such market dominance, a per se bar to international territorial
restraints is not appropriate. In fact the Court's view of tying
arrangements provides authority for such a dominance distinc-
tion. "
Moreover, the courts have at times carved limited excep-
tions to per se rules where the peculiar circumstances of a
particular enterprise or industry warrant such an exception.,
108. "[Tlhe major premise of the Sherman Act is that the suppression of compe-
tition in international trade is in and of itself a public injury . United States v.
National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
109. In White Motor the Justice Department attacked White Motor's franchise
system which limited the customers and territories to which each dealer would be
permitted to sell. White Motor responded that these restraints were entirely reasonable
under the circumstances. White Motor was a small truck company competing against
the automotive giants. In order to survive the competition of the larger manufacturers,
White Motor had to insure that its dealers would actively promote its truck within the
territories assigned to each dealer. The only way to insure such intensive customer
development is to grant each dealer an exclusive territory. Based on these facts the
Court refused to grant summary judgment for the United States.
110. See text accompanying notes 104-107 supra.
111. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
112. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 861
(1977); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
113. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970) (resale restraint needed to insure safe use of the product); Mackey v. National
Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976)(football business has unique features of
a joint venture which relieve it of the full impact of the per se rules). But see Copper
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The problems of starting a new business where success or fail-
ure is in the balance may permit the use of restraints that
would otherwise be illegal per se."4 In particular, the demands
of attempting to penetrate a new international market in the
face of substantial competition can justify even horizontal ter-
ritorial restraints between existing competitors, particularly
when one's foreign competitors are attempting to create a car-
tel among themselves." 5 Aggregating these exceptions, and
considering further the greater probability that the interna-
tional context will create situations invoking such exceptions,
a retreat from the per se approach to international territorial
restraints seems appropriate under the policies expressed in
White Motor and Continental TV.
THE "FRANCHISING" EXCEPTION OF CONTINENTAL TV
Practical business decisions, however, cannot rest on an as
yet unarticulated international noncartel exception. Fortun-
ately, there is sufficient language in Continental TV itself to
permit the specific market division proposed for the
Alpha/Beta group. The trick lies in having the Alpha/Beta re-
straint construed as a permissible franchising arrangement
under the rules expressed in Continental TV. Although the
language of the Court's opinion focuses predominantly on the
distinction between horizontal and vertical territorial re-
straints, the decision's broader practical impact was to judge
territorial franchising arrangements by the rule of reason,
rather than to condemn such practices as per se illegal. The
Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975)(holding that efforts to
maintain quality do not warrant an exception to the per se rule against territorial
restraints).
114. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
a/I'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961)(tying arrangement between sales and service permitted
during initial stages of business to establish community television antennas). Note the
new business and failing company exceptions of Schwinn and see text accompanying
notes 74-75 supra, although at least one court has intimated that such exceptions may
not be applicable when considering horizontal territorial restrictions. Sulmeyer v. Coca
Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 846 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
115. United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18, 34
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), permitted two U.S. airlines to divide routes in an effort to penetrate
the South American market. The impact of this decision is diminished, however, by
the fact that the later creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board provided an administra-
tive mechanism for accomplishing the same result. In fact the Supreme Court reversed
the above decision on the grounds that the issues were within the primary jurisdiction
of the C.A.B. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
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decision creates a new exception for territorial restraints em-
ployed by a functionally unified enterprise."' Although the
vertical/horizontal distinction constitutes a substantial factor
in judging functional unity, that distinction alone is not deter-
minative of the test of illegality to be applied to the restraint.
Consequently, although the Alpha/Beta allocation appears to
be horizontal in nature,"7 that fact does not in itself prevent
the scheme from coming within the Continental TV exception.
Admittedly, at least where independent retailers are in-
volved, Continental TV expressly preserves the per se bar to
horizontal territorial allocations:"
8
There may be occasional problems in differentiating vertical re-
strictions from horizontal restrictions originating in agreements
among the retailers. There is no doubt that restrictions in the
latter category would be illegal per se [citations omitted], but
we do not regard the problems of proof as sufficiently great to
justify a per se rule."'
Nonetheless, the Court's reservations concerning proof prob-
lems expressed in this statement exhibit the Court's concern
over employing the horizontal/vertical distinction as the deter-
minative fact in territorial market allocation analysis. The
Court's statement implicitly recognizes that in the final analy-
sis all territorial market restraints are horizontal: they all allo-
cate territories between competitors at the same level of the
distribution chain. Consequently, if one admits that vertical
territorial franchising arrangements can be permissible, then
horizontal, territorial franchising arrangements must be poten-
tially permissible as well. Since both schemes have the same
final "horizontal" competitive impact, then so must both
schemes be judged by the same antitrust test.
116. The Court rejected the Schwinn rule because it may unduly impede the
growth and success of franchise operations-and thereby impede an enterprise's ability
to compete in the broader interbrand market. 97 S. Ct. at 2560-61.
117. Admittedly the Alpha/Beta agreement allocates territories horizontally on
the manufacturing level, However, since these manufacturers all employ technology
built by Alpha and since Alpha retains a financial interest in the proper exploitation
of this technology, the agreement retains vertical elements. See note 128 infra.
118. This is further supported by the fact that Continental TV relies heavily on
White Motor, which had noted also in dictum that horizontal territorial limitations
"are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition." 372 U.S.
at 263. But see United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 613, 615 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) where the Chief Justice argues that this dicta of White Motor is not preced-
ent.
119. 97 S. Ct. at 2562 n.28.
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The practical impossibility of proving a horizontal re-
straint within a legitimate franchising arrangement confirms
the hypothesis that the vertical/horizontal distinction alone
can not conclusively determine whether the rule of reason or
per se rules will judge the territorial allocation in question.
Even prior to Continental TV the circuit courts' consideration
of the vertical/horizontal factual issue hardly inspired confid-
ence. 20 This factual determination becomes virtually impossi-
ble now that Schwinn has been overruled. Assuming that rule
of reason requirements are met, a new manufacturer can now
establish explicit territories at the outset of a franchising ven-
ture, rendering unnecessary any conspiracy between franchisee
retailers. Similarly, established businesses no longer need em-
ploy the charade of denying franchise applications in order to
maintain an illicit territorial market allocation; they can now
explicitly allocate territories among their retailers. How will it
be possible to show that this new business structure was
prompted by a conspiracy of the retailers and not by the inde-
pendent business judgment of the manufacturer?
2'
Whereas the superficial horizontal/vertical distinction
makes no logical or practical sense, a test addressing the func-
tional unity of the enterprise does. The governing factual issue
becomes the intrabrand nature of the restraint, not the hori-
zontal nature of the restraint. As Continental TV so carefully
pointed out, only the clear anticompetitive impact of a given
type of restraint invokes per se rules.'2 Since territorial alloca-
tions between franchisees will have the same effect on competi-
tion regardless of whether the franchisor or the franchisee first
conceived the restraint, the vertical/horizontal distinction
serves no meaningful function. The intrabrand test, however,
draws a meaningful economic distinction and therefore can
serve to differentiate rule of reason from per se restraints. Al-
though noting the vertical character of Sylvania's restraint, the
basic rationale behind Continental TV's rejection of Schwinn
was the differing economic impact of interbrand and intra-
120. See cases cited in notes 90 & 91 supra. Specifically, compare Quality Mer-
cury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976) with Salco Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975). See also Sheldon Pontiac v. Pontiac Motor
Div., 418 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1976).
121. See discussion of exclusive franchising in Louis, supra note 1, at 286-87.
122. See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
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brand territorial allocations.113 A restraint limited to intra-
brand competition can nonetheless enhance interbrand compe-
tition and thereby generate a a net procompetitive impact.
24
Presumably a territorial restraint of an interbrand nature could
not generate such beneficial results and therefore would still be
illegal per se. Since only the intrabrand distinction corresponds
to a similar distinction in competitive impact, the intrabrand
distinction must afford the test for determining the applicabil-
ity of rule of reason analysis.' 5
By ignoring the vertical/horizontal issue and focusing in-
stead on the intrabrand/interbrand issue, the Continental TV
opinion obtains a certain degree of logical coherence. As noted
above, it would be absurd in practice to attempt to enforce a
total ban against horizontal allocations among franchisees.
However, the Court's statement that horizontal restraints be-
tween retailers continue to be illegal per se makes sense if
viewed as a statement that existing competitors cannot use the
creation of a brand name as a conduit to validate an otherwise
impermissible horizontal market allocation. 2 1 Similarly, the
Court's statement that the intrabrand rule applies only to
products from a particular manufacturer merely reiterates the
Court's desire to prevent combinations between existing com-
petitors, but permit allocations among elements of a function-
ally unified business enterprise. 27 Therefore, as long as a busi-
ness employs market allocations only as part of a functionally
integrated expansion effort by that business, rule of reason
analysis will judge that restraint.
123. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
124. 97 S. Ct. at 2560.
125. "[An antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any
objective benchmarks." Id. at 2560 n.21. Note also that the intrabrand distinction will
be relatively easy to apply to actual factual controversies.
126. This would essentially cover the scheme employed by Topco. See text accom-
panying notes 76-85 supra.
An interesting issue is whether the specific plan struck down in Topco would now
be condemned by the Continental TV Court as well. Although Continental TV cited
Topco with approval, 97 S. Ct. at 2562 n.27 & n.28, the policies expressed in
Continental TV are quite similar to Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Topco and would
seemingly call the Topco decision into question. 405 U.S. at 613. In fact a basic premise
of Topco was the Court's inability to weigh "destruction of competition in one sector
of the economy against promotion of competition in another sector." See text at note
82 supra. Since Continental TV's intrabrand rule expressly assumes that courts can
make such judgment, the basic rationale of Topco has apparently been eliminated.
127. See text accompanying notes 122-125 supra.
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COMPLYING WITH THE CONTINENTAL TV EXCEPTION
Whereas the Alpha/Beta agreement could meet a vertical
restraint exception only through strained construction of the
agreement,'28 the functionally integrated intrabrand exception
can be met easily by structuring the agreement according to
the intrabrand requirement of Continental TV. Three basic
integrative features are required:
(1) The contracting parties must all service the
same brandname;
(2) the contracting parties must have been
created to profitably exploit that brandname; and
(3) the originator of the brand-and of the
restraint-must retain a financial interest in the suc-
cess of the other contracting parties.
By following these rules an enterprise would restrict the terri-
torial allocation to use by a functionally unified business entity
that would in turn fall within the economic rationale of
Continental TV's intrabrand exception. The restraint will be
designed to promote competition, not foreclose competition,
and therefore warrants rule of reason analysis. These rules de-
serve a more extensive explanation.
First, the most obvious requirement is that Alpha and the
Betas manufacture under the same trademark or trade name.
Without creating a single "brand" it will be impossible for the
Alpha/Beta group to fall within the intrabrand exception. The
restraint would then have to be justified under one of the ex-
traordinary exceptions to the per se rules noted above. 29
Second, the Betas must be new enterprises. As Topco
aptly illustrates, and as Continental TV implies, the creation
of a brand name by existing competitors to enforce territorial
arrangements remains illegal per se.130 As an example, interna-
tional cartel cases such as United States v. Bayer have specifi-
cally held that trademark licensing cannot be used as a subter-
fuge for worldwide territorial allocations among existing
competitors. 3
128. The maintenance of an equity interest by Alpha in the Betas may qualify the
restraint as vertical in the view of some, as theoretically the equity interest may deter
any deleterious impact on output from the actual operation of the restraint. Bork,
supra note 7, at 424-25. See note 117 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 113-115 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 76-85 supra and notes 126-127 supra.
131. United States v. Bayer Co., Inc., 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See
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However, creation of new "competitors" preserves the
character of the enterprise as the expansion of a single busi-
ness. In fact some courts have held that one who receives neces-
sary licensed technology from an alleged conspirator,' 3 or one
who is permitted to do business at the suffrance of an alleged
conspirator,'" is not in fact a competitor of that conspirator
such that an agreement between the two would invoke Sher-
man Act liability.'
34
Although the validity of such a relaxed definition of com-
petitor is suspect,'35 the policy behind the view is not. United
States v. DuPont'3 provides an illustration. Among the issues
in this famous cellophane case was whether the origin of Du-
Pont's dominating position in cellophane had developed law-
fully. A French company, La Cellophane, licensed DuPont to
manufacture cellophane in the United States. Incident to this
contract the parties agreed to the territories in which each
would be permitted to sell the product. The district court held
that such territorial restraints were not illegal:
It is not the purpose of the Sherman Act or the common law of
restraints of trade to discourage establishment of a new business
in a new territory. Trade secrets have always been considered in
the nature of a property right. Among the ancillary restraints
which are considered reasonable, both under common law and
Farbefabriken Bayer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1961), aff'd on
other grounds, 307 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 929 (1963). See also
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
132. Foundry Services, Inc. v. The Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd on other grounds, 206 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953).
133. Evans v. S.S. Kresge, 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1976).
134. See also San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp.
966, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1974): Members of the National Hockey League are not competitors
for the purposes of the antitrust laws. "[T]he organizational scheme of the National
Hockey League, by which all its members are bound, imposes no restraint upon trade
or commerce in this relevant market [professional hockey games in the United States
and Canada], but rather makes possible a segment of commercial activity which could
hardly exist without it."
135. For example, in discussing restraints between a parent and an independently
owned offspring, the Supreme Court noted:
We may also assume, though the question is a new one, that a business
entity generally cannot justify restraining trade between itself and an
independently owned entity merely on the ground that it helped launch
that entity, by providing expert advice or seed capital.
United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 117 (1975).
136. 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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the Sherman Act, are those which limit territory in which the
contracting parties may use the trade secret.37
In terms of its specific holding DuPont is not precedent for the
Alpha/Beta agreement. First, DuPont involved the transfer of
a trade secret, a property right; this essay assumes that the
technology transferred to the Betas will not be of such a char-
acter to warrant treatment as a property right, trade secret, or
patent. 131 Secondly, given the limits which the courts have
placed on the scope and extent of trade secret rights, the con-
tinued vitality of the DuPont holding itself is questionable.'39
Nonetheless, the policy behind DuPont remains appropri-
ate for defining the intrabrand exception. The DuPont court
focused on the fact that although DuPont and La Cellophane
may have been potential competitors, they were not in fact
competitors at the time of the agreement. Therefore, rather
than viewing the agreement as an anticompetitive restraint,
the court applauded "the creation of the American cellophane
industry."' 40 The agreement was a joint venture, the purpose of
which "was the development and exploitation of a new busi-
ness to function in American markets."'' Consequently, by
creating competitors rather than organizing existing competi-
tors, one attains the aura of expansion of a single enterprise,
at least in practical effect. This distinction between creating
new competitors and regulating old competitors creates a legit-
137. 118 F. Supp. at 219.
138. Much technology sought by developing countries is not of a nature that would
customarily receive U.S. property right protection. See Goekjian, supra note 11.
139. A patent can support a territorial restraint in foreign commerce. Dunlop Co.,
Ltd. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407, 417 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917
(1974); Brownell V. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954); United
States v. L.D. Caulk Co., 126 F. Supp. 693 (D. Del. 1954); American Optical Co. v.
New Jersey Optical Co., 58 F. Supp. 601 (D. Mass. 1944). This rule is presumably
limited by the domestic rule that the restraint can only extend to the licensee, not his
customers. See Hensley Equipment Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir.
1967); American Industrial Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enterprises, Inc., [1973-2]
Trade Cases (CCH) 74,619 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
However, these permissible restraints derive from the monopoly power expressly
granted by statute. A trade secret, lacking that statutory grant, cannot generally be
used to enforce restraints of trade. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Hohn D. Park & Sons C..,
220 U.S. 373, 400-02 (1911). See United States v. Hughes Tool Co., [1958] Trade
Cases (CCH) 69,001 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where in a consent decree defendant agreed
not to restrain the imports of persons to whom it had licensed trade secrets.




imate integrated interest, distinguishing the enterprise from an
illegal per se Topco restraint.'
Third, the final requirement to forestall antitrust liability
is an equity interest by Alpha in each of the Betas. Preferably,
this interest should be to the fullest extent permitted by
local law. The Continental TV rule applies to products of a
"particular manufacturer." By integrating to the fullest extent
possible, an enterpise not only enhances its character as a func-
tionally unified business, but also forestalls arguments that the
overseas expansion unreasonably absorbs enterprises that
would otherwise be potential, if not actual, competitors.'
142. See Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). In Kestenbaum the court refused to judge by a per
se rule efforts by a brewer, Falstaff, to establish a price ceiling on the sale of its
distributorships:
Under the particular facts of the case sub judice, where the price fixer
must extend the very distribution-rights privilege which gave Kesten-
baum's busines its value, any restraint legitimately imposed to safeguard
that privilege does not have such a deleterious impact as to create illegal-
ity as a matter of law. Rather, this type of situation necessitates an
inquiry into the business purpose and reasonableness of the restraint
employed, and must be measured under the rule of reason standard.
Id. at 696. The combination of the fact that the rights sold were created by Falstaff,
with the legitimate self interest of Falstaff in insuring the success of its franchisees,
precluded the per se rule normally applied in price fixing cases:
It logically follows that Falstaff has a right to restrict the sales price of
one of its distributorship franchises to the reasonable value of that fran-
chise in order to insure that the purchaser will have a chance to realize a
reasonable return on his investment. Falstaff clearly has a strong interest
in the financial vitality of a new franchisee. If the purchaser of a franchise
makes a bad bargain when he buys, then he cannot give the distributor-
ship the solid, concerned management which it must have to be success-
ful for him and to enhance Falstaff's image and relative position in the
market.
Id. Admittedly the Falstaff restraint lacks the clear horizontal implications of the
Alpha/Beta allocation; in practical effect the price ceiling benefitted only Falstaff.
However, the case nonetheless stands for the willingness of the courts to refrain from
per se rules when the restraints are imposed by a parental enterprise seeking to insure
the success of the entire multienterprise operation. See discussion of Citizens and
Southern Nat 'l Bank at text accompanying notes 145-157 infra; Worthen Bank & Trust
Co. v. National Bankamericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 918 (1974). See also Akron Tire Supply Co. v. Gebr. Hofmann KG, 390 F. Supp.
1395, 1402 (N.D. Ohio 1974), which stated that the old Schwinn rule applied only to
territorial restraints which limited competition between distributors; territorial re-
straints limiting competition between a manufacturer and its distributors are judged
by the rule of reason.
143. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), established
the modern rule that joint ventures may violate the merger provison, section 7 of the
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As Timken aptly illustrates, even a substantial equity in-
terest is not in itself sufficient to certify an enterprise as unified
to the extent necessary to avoid antitrust liability. However,
when practical or legal considerations prevent expansion by
means of a fully integrated company, a lesser standard of unity
should be required. Continental TV implies as much; when
justifying its rejection of Schwinn, the Court expressly noted
that per se analysis may well bar the entry of smaller enter-
prises, which would not be able to avoid the rule against mar-
ket allocations by integrating to the extent required by
Schwinn. 44
Perhaps more directly on point, however, is the Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Citizens & Southern Na-
tional Bank. 4 C & S National Bank had tried to avoid a state
law which prohibited branch banking. The law limited to five
percent ownership of a bank's stock by a bank holding com-
pany. In response C & S established a number of "five percent
banks," in which C & S owned five percent of the stock, and
C & S officers, shareholders, and friends owned substantial
portions of the rest. At the time these banks were established
Clayton Act, when the impact of the joint venture arrangement unduly diminishes
potential competition in an industry. Thus, even when one or both of the joint ventur-
ers would not in fact have entered the market by themselves, if the enterprises serving
the market thought that either or both might enter the market, that threat of potential
entry will exert a procompetitive impact on the marketplace. If the procompetitive
impact of one new competitor cannot outweigh the anticompetitive impact of the
elimination of two potential competitors, then the joint venture may violate the Clay-
ton Act. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
Applying the same analysis to the Alpha/Beta scheme, Alpha must maintain a
substantial equity interest in each of their Betas in order to avoid a potential competi-
tion attack. If Alpha maintains only a token equity interest in each of the Betas, then
each new Beta, or more specifically the investment capital that formed the Beta,
represented a potential competitor of Alpha and the other member of the industry.
Since the Alpha/Beta market allocation eliminates this competition-at least as con-
cerns Alpha-Penn-Olin reasoning may apply to strike down the restraint and the
joint venture. (Note that one does not already have to be a member of the industry in
order for the potential competition rule to apply, see FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S., 568 (1967)).
On the other hand, by maintaining a major equity interest, Alpha can argue that
without its investment capital and without its technology the Betas not only could not
have entered the market, but could not have been expected to enter the market.
Therefore the Alpha/Beta agreement eliminates no significant potential competition.
144. "Capital requirements and administrative expenses may prevent smaller
firms from using the exception" to Schwinn where the manufacturer retains title. 97
S. Ct. at 2561.
145. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
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it was understood that they would be acquired by C & S as soon
as the law permitted."' When the law was indeed changed, C
& S sought to acquire its de facto branches. The Justice De-
partment challenged the acquisition under section 7 of the
Clayton Act, and further alleged that the ongoing cooperative
relationship between C & S and its de facto branches violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act, claiming in part a conspiracy to
fix interest rates and prices, as well as an unreasonable amount
of cooperation embodied in the bank's service agreements."7
Although the Supreme Court was aided by the district
court's determination that the alleged price restraints had in
fact not occurred, 4 8 the Court's ruling upholding the C & S de
facto branch service agreements implied that even price fixing
liability would not have been imposed on the conspirators due
to the unusual legal constraints under which C & S had to
operate. In judging the unreasonable cooperation claim, the
Court noted that the banks in question would not have been
created but for the impetus of C & S' efforts." 9 As the Court
recognized, this fact does not normally immunize restraints
between possible competitors from antitrust liability. 50
But these general principles do not dispose of the present case.
C & S was absolutely restrained by state law from reaching the
suburban market through the preferred process of internal expan-
sion. De facto branching was the closest available substitute.",'
Construing Georgia's banking law as a horizontal territorial
market division, per se illegal if done by private parties, the
Court found the cooperation between C & S and its branches
to be entirely reasonable: "To characterize these relationships
as an unreasonable restraint of trade is to forget that their
whole purpose and effect was to defeat a restraint of trade.","
Citizens & Southern is distinguishable from the
Alpha/Beta restraint. The services agreement which the above-
cited language addressed was already sanctioned in part by the
banking laws;'53 the Court was not considering the validity of
146. Id. at 91-93.
147. Id. at 96-97.
148. Id. at 112-15.
149. Id. at 111.
150. See note 135 supra; id. at 117.
151. Id. at 117.
152. Id. at 118.
153. Id. at 114-15.
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an alleged per se restraint of trade.' 4 However, once again the
policy behind the Citizens & Southern decision would permit
the territorial restaints sought to be employed by the
Alpha/Beta group. The Court noted that the C & S de facto
branching program was procompetitive; it created new outlets
in the suburbs thereby increasing consumer choice. Similarly,
the Alpha/Beta enterprise is designed to create new manufac-
turing units toward a procompetitive end. Although the Betas
would not compete between themselves, the restraint would
generally enhance the group's ability to compete in a greater
number of foreign markets. Additionally, one must consider
the broader policy incentives of distributing profits and in-
dustrial capacity to competitively underprivileged countries.
Because of the ultimate procompetitive impact, unified
expansion within the confines of legally imposed equity limits
apparently justifies market restraints normally permitted only
in fully integrated enterprises. When the government suggested
that C & S could have developed less restrictive agreements
with its de facto branches, the Court responded in part that it
would be unrealistic to expect C & S to create new branches
that would fully compete with itself.'55 Thus, when local law
made internal expansion impossible, it was not only proper to
create de facto outlets, but permissible as well to limit their
competitive impact on the de facto parent. If this indeed is the
general rule to be derived from Citizens & Southern National
Bank, then the Alpha/Beta territorial restrictions would appar-
ently be sanctioned as reasonable restraints designed to immu-
nize a parent from the competition of its offspring. Admittedly,
sponsorship alone creates no antitrust immunity; "otherwise
the technique of sponsorship followed by restraint might dis-
place internal growth as the normal and legitimate technique
of business expansion, with unknowable consequences. ' '5
However, when local law prevents such internal growth, pre-
sumably even territorial restraints limiting competition with
the parent become valid. Thus the Alpha/Beta restraint also
becomes valid where Alpha integrates to the fullest extent per-
mitted by local law.' 7
154. Id. at 116.
155. Id. at 119.
156. Id. at 117.
157. Citizens and Southern potentially broadens the impact of the following state-
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Even assuming that the Citizens & Southern rule cannot
by itself legitimize a per se restraint such as a territorial alloca-
tion, the analysis of Citizens & Southern supports a characteri-
zation of the Alpha/Beta scheme as a functionally integrated
enterprise within the Continental TV intrabrand exception. As
noted above, Continental TV defines intrabrand competition
in terms of the product of a particular manufacturer. Given the
Court's analysis of the practical realities behind Citizens and
Southern's de facto branching program, the Alpha/Beta pro-
gram of expansion could also be viewed as the expansion of one
basic enterprise that would qualify for lenient intrabrand treat-
ment. One might even argue that Continental TV's endorse-
ment of franchising limits the Citizens & Southern dictum bar-
ring sponsorship followed by restraint, at least where the agree-
ment would pose no potential competition problems.'
Finally, although perhaps not required, one further step
should be taken by the Alpha/Beta group to insure immunity
from the per se territorial rule: The territorial allocation agree-
ment should run only for a term of years, preferably no longer
than the useful life of the original manufacturing facility to be
established by Alpha for the Betas. One of the principal argu-
ments for per se rules is that even though a given restriction
may be currently reasonable in its impact, there is nothing to
ment in 3M:
With part of the defendants' argument there can be no legitimate quarrel.
It is axiomatic that if over a sufficiently long period American enterprises,
as a result of political or economic barriers, cannot export directly or
indirectly from the United States to a particular foreign country at a
profit, then any private action taken to secure or interfere solely with
business in that area, whatever else it may do, does not restrain foreign
commerce in that area in violation of the Sherman Act. For the very
hypothesis is that there is not and could not be any American foreign
commerce in that area which could be restrained or monopolized.
United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 958 (D. Mass. 1950).
This statement in 3M permits only restraints that are specifically designed to avoid
foreign government prohibitions. Presumably, at least in the case of equity restriction,
Citizens and Southern would also permit restraints ancillary to compliance with those
restrictions. Theoretically, in certain circumstances, territorial market allocations
would constitute such a reasonable ancillary restraint.
158. In other words, expansion thru sponsorship and restraint would be permissi-
ble as long as the new businesses were not potential competitors. The arrangement
would increase production in an industry without eliminating any existing competi-
tion, real or potential. In fact future courts may wish to employ potential competition
analysis as a means of judging the reasonability of intrabrand restraints. See note 143
supra.
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prevent unreasonable use of that restriction in the future."9 By
restricting the duration of the restraint this rationale for impos-
ing per se analysis on the Alpha/Beta restraint is undermined.
Certainly the time limitation will also aid justification of the
restraint based on a rule of reason test.
CONCLUSION
The Continental TV decision, by heralding a reexamina-
tion of the per se rules concerning territorial restraints, pro-
vides a mechanism whereby the discriminatory impact of the
per se rules against LDC enterprises can be redressed. Argu-
ably the rationale of Continental TV alone precludes per se
analysis in the international arena in noncartel situations.
However, even absent such a broad reading, LDC enterprises
can now possibly escape the per se bar to territorial allocations
by structuring the enterprise as a functionally integrated unit
using intrabrand restraints. Although a territorial restraint
which concerns only intrabrand competition does not in itself
escape per se analysis, one can avoid being characterized as a
Topco horizontal association by "conspiring" only with newly
created enterprises. One further meets the "particular manu-
facturer" requirement of Continental TV by integrating into a
single entity to the maximum extent permitted by local law.
Consequently, by following these suggestions, and by further
limiting the duration of the territorial restraint, a U.S. firm
can expand into LDCs thru the form of an Alpha/Beta agree-
ment with reasonably confident expectations that one has
complied with the demands of the antitrust laws.
159. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
